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1. INTRODUCTION 
What is the impact of economic sanctions on the protection of 
human rights?  The literature debates whether sanctions offer an 
effective instrument to secure foreign policy goals1 and suggests 
causal links between sanctions and leadership change.2  Human 
rights scholars examine the unintended adverse impact that 
development and democratization exert on the level of human 
rights protection;3 the effect that economic intervention has on the 
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 1 See e.g., GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 
49–50 (3d ed. 2007) (outlining a method for analyzing the utility of economic 
sanctions for foreign policy goals); see also Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions 
Do Not Work, 22 INT’L SECURITY 90, 109 (1997) (suggesting that “the empirical basis 
on which advocates have promoted economic sanctions . . . is fundamentally 
flawed, and that the deductive logic behind the theory does not consider the 
characteristics of modern nation-states that weaken the effectiveness of economic 
sanctions”); Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Still Do Not Work, 23 INT’L 
SECURITY 66, 66 (1998) (arguing  that there is “no basis for even qualified optimism 
about the effects of sanctions”). 
2 See Nikolay Marinov, Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders? 49 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 564, 575 (2005) (noting that “[l]ong-run sanctions against some of 
the world’s most vicious regimes have done much to obscure the average effect of 
economic sanctions.”). 
3 See generally Christian Davenport, The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An 
Empirical Assessment, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 539 (2004) (discussing whether 
democratization reduces the likelihood of violent repressive activity); see also 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et al., Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy 
and Human Rights, 49 INT’L STUD. Q. 439, 440 (2005) (“States cannot rapidly 
improve human rights conditions by focusing on particular aspects of the 
democratization process at the expense of other aspects that appear less strongly 
related to the protection of personal integrity rights.”). 
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level of that protection;4 and the role of legal systems,5 regime 
type,6 reputation,7 and political parties.8  The link between 
economic sanctions and human rights remains unexplored.  This 
Article investigates this very question:  do economic sanctions 
impact state practice with respect to human rights through shifts in 
leadership?  Our focus is on physical integrity—the rights to life, 
freedom from torture, and humane treatment.9  We proceed by 
taking a close look at a subset of cases where states imposed 
economic sanctions for reasons other than human rights violations 
in the target country.10  We then evaluate the record of rights 
protection in the target country before and after the onset of 
sanctions. 
This Article addresses the impact of leadership change on 
human rights protection in four countries:  Turkey, Fiji, Pakistan 
and Sierra Leone.  All four countries were subjected to economic 
sanctions, which typically have a destabilizing effect on 
 
4 See Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade 
Agreements Influence Government Repression, 59 INT’L ORG. 593, 624 (2005) 
(“[Preferential Trade Agreements] are certainly not ideal forms of human rights 
governance and they are not a replacement for human rights laws.”); see also M. 
Rodwan Abouharb & David L. Cingranelli, The Human Rights Effects of World Bank 
Structural Adjustment, 1981-2000, 50 INT’L STUD. Q. 233, 233 (2006) (arguing that 
certain “economic changes often cause at least short-term hardships for the 
poorest people in less developed countries”).  But see David L. Richards, et al., 
Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for 
Human Rights in Developing Countries, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 219, 219 (2001) (finding 
that “both foreign direct investment and portfolio investment are reliably 
associated with increased government respect for human rights.”). 
5 See BETH SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS (forthcoming, 2009). 
6 See BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., THE LOGIC OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL 406 
(2005) (“[M]ore resources increase the advantage in the provision of private goods 
that leaders with small winning coalitions hold over possible challengers, 
increasing their hold on office.”). 
7 See George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and 
International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95, S97 (2002) (“[T]he reputational 
consequences of a state’s noncompliance with a given treaty are similarly limited 
by the history of its cooperative relationships with the other member states.”). 
8 See James Raymond Vreeland, Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why 
Dictatorships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture, 62 INT’L ORG. 
65, 93 (2008) (“[D]ictatorships with multiple political parties are more likely to 
sign and ratify the CAT.”). 
9 These rights fall under the broader category of civil and political rights, 
currently regulated under the 1966 United Nations Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. 
10 This subset of cases is extracted from HUFBAUER ET AL, supra note 1. 
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governments.11  Distressed leaders often engage in more 
repression.  It follows that in countries where economic sanctions 
contributed to shifts in leadership in a timely manner, one should 
observe higher levels of human rights protection.  Sierra Leone in 
1997 illustrates this example.12  Conversely, when there is no 
leadership change following the imposition of economic sanctions, 
one should observe higher levels of repression.  Pakistan in 1999 
exemplifies this pattern.13 
Surprisingly, in Turkey there was no leadership change 
following the 1980 coup and the subsequent imposition of 
sanctions, but the level of human rights protection actually 
improved.  In the same vein, Fiji in 1987 underwent leadership 
change, but human rights protection worsened.  This Article sets 
out to solve the puzzle these two countries present.14  Our findings 
suggest that characteristics of their transition to democracy, after 
economic sanctions were imposed, carry strong explanatory power 
in these two cases. 
The Article is structured as follows:  Section 2 summarizes the 
sanctions literature, focusing on the causal mechanisms associated 
 
11 See Marinov, supra note 2, at 565. 
12 The civil war in Sierra Leone lasted from 1991 to 2002.  The rebel faction 
known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) initially organized in 1985 
following the rise of Jospeh Momoh, a military leader, but was fueled further by 
government corruption and mismanagement of the country’s diamond resources.  
The particularly brutal conflict resulted in the breakdown of state institutions and 
government control, left approximately 100,000 Sierra Leoneans dead, and caused 
the displacement of over 2 million more.  Foreign intervention, particularly by 
British and UN troops, was instrumental in brokering the ceasefire, but the 
country is still extremely fragile and attempting to rebuild following the decade of 
conflict. 
13 In 1999 Prime Minister Narwaz Sharif was ousted by General Pervez 
Musharraf in a bloodless coup.  Subsequently, Musharraf suspended Parliament 
and the constitution, declared a state of emergency, and named himself chief 
executive.  The United States was required to impose sanctions under the Foreign 
Operations Appropriations Act which stipulates such action be taken when a 
democratically elected leader is removed from power.  This sanction episode, 
rather than the one relating to nuclear testing which was imposed around the 
same time, is the focus of this Article.  The sanctions in question were lifted 
following Pakistan’s support of the United States in the War on Terror in 2001.  
Peterson Institute for International Economics, Case Studies in Sanctions and 
Terrorism: Case 99-3, http://www.petersoninstitute.org/research/topics 
/sanctions/pakistanb.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). 
14 We follow the research design technique advocated by John Gerring, 
identifying “deviant” cases “to probe for new—but as yet unspecified—
explanations.”  JOHN GERRING, CASE STUDY RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 
106 (2007). 
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with levels of success and failure.  Section 3 discusses conclusions 
about the political economy of human rights protection, again, 
concentrating on causal mechanisms of relevance to our research 
question.  Section 4 presents case studies, Section 5 offers 
theoretical perspectives on future research, and Section 6 
concludes. 
2. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND LEADERSHIP SURVIVAL 
The benchmark study on economic sanctions is now on its third 
edition15 and continues to find that economic sanctions contributed 
to their stated goals in about thirty-four percent of the cases.16  
Aside from this important finding, two of the study’s conclusions 
carry implications for our research question:  economic sanctions 
are more effective when imposed against democracies; and 
sanctions succeed more often when they target friendly nations.17  
By contrast, sanctions are more likely to fail when they target 
autocratic regimes that insulate themselves from the international 
community—precisely countries where human rights violations 
are rampant.18 
Sanctions seem to carry little direct weight when it comes to 
autocratic leaders’ decision to repress their own populations.  
However, because sanctions destabilize incumbents, they may 
worsen the record of rights protection in the target country 
anyway.  This intuition derives from the work of Nikolay 
Marinov19 and from that of other scholars writing in the Selectorate 
model tradition.20 
 
15 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1. 
16 Id. at 159. 
17 Id. at 164. 
18 See TODD LANDMAN, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
108–11 (2005) (using a series of independent variables such as democracy, wealth, 
and involvement in international organizations to conclude that countries 
plagued with civil and international war and having large populations are 
significantly associated with higher levels of human rights violations). 
19 See generally Marinov, supra note 2 (arguing that economic pressure and 
sanctions destabilize the targeted nation’s leader). 
20 See e.g., BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 75 (“Leaders stay in 
power by raising government revenue through taxation and then spending that 
revenue, dividing it between public-goods allocations that benefit everyone in the 
society and private rewards that go only to members of the winning coalition.”); 
Fiona McGillivray & Allan C. Stam, Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the 
Duration of Economic Sanctions, 48 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 154, 164–70 (2004) (testing a 
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Leadership survival is the centerpiece of this research agenda.  
Incumbents are primarily concerned with holding on to power; as 
a consequence, most policy decisions—from the provision of public 
goods, to taxation and repression—are guided by the goal of 
survival.21  Authoritarian leaders care even more about survival, 
for reasons explained below.  Thus, the struggle for political 
survival is fundamentally different for democratic incumbents as 
opposed to dictators. 
The Selectorate model proposes that any polity can be 
understood in terms of four features:  (1) a winning coalition, or 
the group of individuals whose support is essential to keep a 
leader in power; (2) a selectorate, or the group who possess the 
means to join the winning coalition; (3) the disenfranchised; and (4) 
the leader.22  Given this political architecture, scholars writing in 
this tradition found a strong association between the size of the 
winning coalition and regime type.  Autocratic regimes typically 
rely on small winning coalitions.  It follows that an autocratic 
leader needs only to please a select few to remain in power.  The 
most effective way to accomplish this task is to reward this group 
with private goods.  Among other advantages, private rewards 
bring about more loyalty.  Human rights protection lies clearly 
outside of the private goods definition, as it is non-excludable and 
characterized by non-rival consumption.23  Within this framework, 
authoritarian regimes will systematically undersupply the core 
human rights:  civil liberties, political rights, transparency, and 
peace.  This expectation is confirmed by empirical research.24  
Among the reasons leaders have to suppress human rights, and to 
engage in repression, is their own political survival: 
Now we turn to what our theory says about the occurrence, 
magnitude, and intensity of oppression. . . . First, leaders 
 
theory of sanction duration that focuses on differences between democratic and 
nondemocratic states in the structure of leaders’ support coalition). 
21 See McGillivray & Stam, supra note 20, at 160 (“We characterize both 
nondemocratic and democratic leaders’ goals as ensuring their political 
survival.”). 
22 See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 37, 331–38 (introducing the 
Selectorate theory and describing the relevant sets of people within any polity). 
23 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND 
THE THEORY OF GROUPS 14–16 (Schocken Books 1971) (1965) (characterizing 
“nonexcludability” as an element of “public” or “collective” goods). 
24 See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 338–40 (highlighting various 
examples of oppressive political regimes). 
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may seek to punish challengers. . . . Second, leaders may 
seek to punish members of the selectorate who support a 
challenger. . . . Third, leaders may seek to punish the 
disenfranchised who might be engaged in revolutionary 
action against the regime.25 
Furthermore, “small winning-coalition systems not only 
provide a strong incentive for leaders to oppress, they also 
strengthen this incentive by punishing removed leaders.”26 
What role does political survival play in the economic 
sanctions debate?  According to Marinov, a very important one.  In 
an article that seeks to mitigate possible selection problems in the 
Hufbauer, Schott, Elliott, and Oegg study,27 Marinov finds that 
economic sanctions are very effective at destabilizing leaders.  
Analyzing data on 136 countries, observed over an average of 
thirty-seven years, Marinov reports that the risk of losing power 
increases by twenty-eight percent with respect to the baseline if an 
incumbent leader is the subject of sanctions during that year.28  
Hence economic sanctions appear to be intertwined with the 
struggle for political survival. 
In summary, the state of knowledge with respect to economic 
sanctions indicates that they are of limited success as a foreign 
policy instrument,29 and that they operate through the imposition 
of credible challenges to the political survival of leaders in the 
target country.30  Recalling predictions of the Selectorate model 
with respect to threats to the political survival of authoritarian 
leaders, we expect these leaders to engage in more repression.31  
And we emphasize that, within this polity, human rights 
protection is already undersupplied.  We chose case studies based 
on these expectations in Section 4.32  The next Section explores the 
recent scholarship on the political economy of human rights.  This 
 
25 Id. at 339–40. 
26 Id. at 343. 
27 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1. 
28 Marinov, supra note 2, at 565. 
29 See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 159 (finding economic sanctions to 
have successfully achieved their state policy goals in about 34 percent of cases). 
30 Marinov, supra note 2. 
31 See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 343 (noting that the leaders, 
themselves, do not generally carry out the oppressive measures, but, instead, 
recruit a large number of people into the “organs of oppression”). 
32 Case selection also followed the prescriptions of GERRING, supra note 14. 
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literature uncovers unanticipated adverse consequences that 
democratization and development carry with respect to the 
protection of rights. 
3.  DEVELOPMENT, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FINDINGS ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
Contrary to conventional wisdom regarding the beneficial 
consequences of economic development and democratization for 
the protection of human rights, scholars have recently found that 
these two pillars of modern political thought have in fact 
unintended adverse effects.  In particular, rights to physical 
integrity—such as the right to life and the prohibition of torture—
are sensitive in the short-term to developmental and democratizing 
pressures.  Economic development empowers the lower classes 
that, in turn, begin to demand more of the political leadership.  
This tension evokes political repression, especially by authoritarian 
regimes.  Similarly, democratization vents suppressed political 
voices, creating tensions that authoritarian leaders prefer to put 
down. 
Davenport analyzes variations in the level of democratization, 
measured through the presence of constraints on executive power, 
to investigate if the movement towards full democracy entails a 
differentiated response on the part of political leaders.33  He 
distinguishes between killings and political repression.34  Based on 
data from Freedom House35 and from the political terror scale,36 
covering 137 countries over a twenty-year time span, Davenport 
concludes that democratizing leaders tend to engage in fewer 
killings, but remain repressive.37  In a related inquiry, Bueno de 
 
33 Davenport, supra note 3. 
34 Id. at 543 (“I disaggregate repression into violent (personal integrity 
violations) and non- or less-violent activities (restrictions of political/civil 
liberties)”). 
35 See FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM IN THE WORLD (2008), 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15 (last visited Feb. 10, 2009) 
(examining the state of civil and political rights in the international community). 
36 See Steven C. Poe et al., Repression of the Human Right to Physical Integrity 
Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993, 43 INT’L STUD. 
Q. 291 (1999) (investigating global human rights violations by various nation-
states). 
37 See Davenport, supra note 3, at 540 (“Movement toward full constraint (i.e., 
democratization) leads to various combinations of restriction and killing but not 
at the highest values of the latter, indicating that repression is tamed.”). 
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Mesquita et al. find that democratization does not improve the 
record of rights protection until after the process is almost 
completethat is, when states have reached adequate levels of 
multiparty competition: 
The principal prescriptive message of the analysis appears 
to be that those interested in human rights should focus 
their time and effort on figuring out how best to promote 
broad-based participation and competition.  In particular, 
the building blocks that help institutionalize democracy do 
not appear to yield major gains in respect for human rights 
until party competition is normalized . . . .  It is unlikely 
that one will see dramatic improvements in respect for 
human rights as the process of institutionalizing democracy 
unfolds.  Rather, the payoff comes when the threshold has 
been passed in terms of party competition.38 
It appears that the road towards improved levels of human 
rights protection is more sinuous than initially thought.  The first 
steps in the direction of full democracy are replete with 
opportunities for more repression.  When economic sanctions aim 
at promoting democracy, they may inadvertently release pressures 
that increase the frequency of human rights violations.  Certain 
strategies to promote economic development show the same 
effects.  Here, we emphasize World Bank structural adjustment 
agreements, as explored by Abouharb and Cingranelli,39 because 
we suspect that the same causal mechanism may be at play during 
an economic sanctions episode.40 
For Abouharb and Cingranelli, the conditions attached to 
World Bank packages provoke pressure from adversely affected 
segments of society that ultimately lead to tensions with the 
government and to repression.  Their study analyzes 442 structural 
adjustment packages that were awarded between 1981 and 2000.  
Despite an initial improvement in human rights attributed to 
negotiating pressures (the negotiation hypothesis), ultimately, 
during the implementation phase, adjustment agreements bring 
about more violations of physical integrity rights: 
 
38 Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 453. 
39 Abouharb & Cingranelli, supra note 4. 
40 For an example of even stronger effects, when compared to World Bank 
adjustment agreements, see JAMES R. VREELAND, THE IMF AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (2003) (describing the IMF’s record of prescriptions). 
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The most important substantive finding of this study is that 
receiving and implementing a [structural adjustment 
agreement] from the World Bank had the net effect of 
worsening government respect for all types of physical 
integrity rights.  This finding is generally consistent with 
the findings of previous comparative and case study 
research on the human rights effects of IMF [structural 
adjustment agreements].41 
As mentioned, we believe that similar pressures may result 
from economic sanctions.  For instance, suspending trade leads to 
shortages, higher prices and inflation, which can easily bring about 
protests and civil unrest—followed by state-sponsored 
repression.42  These findings challenge some fundamental beliefs 
concerning human rights guarantees, namely, that democratization 
and development unequivocally lead to higher levels of protection.  
In the next Section we present two case studies to explore another 
widely held belief:  that economic sanctions have either positive 
consequences for the level of rights protection or no effects at all. 
We examine countries that were targeted by economic sanctions, 
according to the criteria discussed below, in order to investigate 
sanctions’ impact on protection.  Case selection sought to identify 
typical and deviant cases43 in the economic sanctions dataset of 
Hufbauer et al.44 
4.  DATA AND CASE STUDIES 
This Section takes a closer look at four countries that illustrate 
clear patterns of variation on the dependent and independent 
variables. The choice of cases and the subsequent analysis was 
based on a subset of the database created by Hufbauer et al.,45 
excluding:  (1) cases that aimed at improving the situation of 
 
41 Abouharb & Cingranelli, supra note 4, at 256. 
42 To be sure, not all economic instruments behave alike.  Certain kinds of 
preferential trade agreements as well as foreign economic penetration, 
respectively, have a positive impact on rights protection, through significant 
reductions in instances of repression.  See Hafner-Burton, supra note 4, at 623–24 
(discussing the benefits of preferential trade agreements); Richards et al., supra 
note 4, at 234 (“Our evidence strongly contradicts the . . . argument that [foreign 
economic penetration] will make life worse for citizens of developing countries.”). 
43 GERRING, supra note 14, at 106. 
44 HUFBAUER  ET AL., supra note 1. 
45 Id. 
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human rights in the target country, (2) cases of unilateral sanctions, 
and (3) cases prior to 1981.  These exclusions seek to eliminate 
confounding factors, to concentrate efforts on cases where 
sanctions had a higher chance of reaching the stated goal,46 and to 
respect limitations in the human rights data.47  Finally, cases were 
selected where key variables behaved consistently over time. 
These criteria led us to the following cases: 
(1) Australia, New Zealand, and India against Fiji (1987–2001);48 
(2) United Nations and The Economic Communities of West 
African States (“ECOWAS”) against Sierra Leone (1997–2003);49 
(3) European Community against Turkey (1981–1986);50 
(4) United States and Japan against Pakistan (1999–2001).51 
In the first two cases, there was a leadership change after 
economic sanctions were imposed.  Whereas human rights 
improved in Sierra Leone, as customary thinking would predict, 
they actually deteriorated in Fiji!  In the last two cases, there was 
no leadership change after sanctions were imposed.  While in 
Pakistan the level of protection went down, as customary thinking 
would expect, in Turkey the level actually went up! 
These patterns of human rights protection can be observed in 
Figure 1, which presents the Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Human 
Rights Dataset’s physical integrity index for each country, between 
1981 and 2006.52  The index is a cumulative measure of government 
protection of several rights to physical integrity that the authors 
 
46 HUFBAUER ET AL. suggest that international cooperation amongst senders 
increases the chances of success of economic sanctions.  See id. at 57–59 (applying 
an index scaled from 1 to 4 to grade the extent of international cooperation). 
47 Freedom House started collecting data on political rights and civil liberties 
on 1973.  A more comprehensive collection is not available until after 1976.  See 
FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 35 (providing ratings and reports on 193 countries and 
15 disputed territories in democracy and freedom). 
48 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 28. 
49 Id. at 32. 
50 Id. at 26. 
51 Id. at 32. 
52 David L. Cingranelli & David L. Richards, The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) 
Human Rights Dataset (2008), http://www.humanrightsdata.org (last visited Feb. 
17, 2009). 
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assess in a disaggregated manner.53  On this figure, higher values 
correspond to higher levels of protection. 
FIGURE 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In Fiji, right after sanctions were imposed in 1987, there is an 
observable sharp decline in the level of rights protection.  In Sierra 
Leone, the imposition of sanctions in 1997 is followed by 
improvement in rights protection, which is arguably mediated by 
the consequences of leadership change—as predicted by the 
literature.  Pakistan represents yet another typical case, inasmuch 
as a dismal human rights record worsens even further, after 
sanctions were imposed in 1999.  Here again, the predictions of the 
literature are just on target, as there was no leadership change.  
Turkey’s human rights record is poorly represented in Figure 1, 
because CIRI’s data starts on 1981, one year after the coup that put 
an end to the second wave of democratization in the country.  
Nevertheless, one can see an improvement in the level of rights 
protection, which is corroborated by more comprehensive data 
 
53 This is an additive index constructed from four physical integrity variables: 
(1) torture; (2) extrajudicial killing; (3) political imprisonment; and (4) 
disappearances.  It ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 
8 (full government respect for these four rights).  See David L. Cingranelli & David 
L. Richards, Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for 
Physical Integrity Rights, 43 INT’L STUD. Q. 407, 409–10 (1999) (describing the 
methods used for measuring variations in overall respect for physical integrity 
rights by different governments of the world). 
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from different sources.  Turkey in 1981 illustrates leadership 
continuity, despite several steps in the direction of democracy, 
thereby contradicting the predictions of the human rights literature 
with respect to the level of rights protection. 
The puzzle presented by the Turkish and Fijian cases is worth 
further exploration.  First, the political history of these two 
countries around the time they were the target of economic 
sanctions must be analyzed.  The standard socio-economic and 
political variables that have been shown in prior research to impact 
human rights protection will also be examined.54  To that end, 
yearly data on GDP growth, per capita GNI, population, and 
population growth has been collected.55  The political variables 
include:  (1) the Political Terror Scale,56 which works as an 
alternative measure of human rights protection; (2) the Correlates 
of War database,57 which indicates whether these countries were 
involved in an international armed conflict or in a civil war (or 
both) during the ten-year period surrounding the imposition of 
sanctions; and (3) the countries’ respective democracy scores, as 
measured by Polity IV.58  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
54 See LANDMAN, supra note 18, at 110 (using a series of independent variables 
such as democracy, wealth, and involvement in international organizations to 
examine and explain global variation in human rights protection). 
55 These data are from the World Bank Development Indicators, 
http://web.worldbank.org (follow “Data and Research” at top; then follow 
“Data”; then follow “Data” on sidebar) (last visited Feb. 19, 2009). 
56 See Poe et al., supra note 36, at 298 (applying Political Terror Scale to 
measure personal integrity rights abuse). 
57 See J. David Singer & Melvin Small, Correlates of War Project: International 
and Civil War Data, 1816–1992 (1994), available at http://www.data-
archive.ac.uk/doc/3441/mrdoc/ascii/a3441cbk.asc (collecting data on all 
international and civil wars from 1816-1992). 
58 See Keith Jaggers & Ted Robert Gurr, Tracking Democracy’s Third Wave with 
the Polity III Data, 32 J. PEACE RES. 469 (1995) (providing Polity III data for research 
on democracy). 
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TABLE 1 – CASE STUDIES. 
 Leadership Change 
 
 Yes 
 
No 
 
Level of 
Protection 
 
Down 
 
 
Fiji 
1987–2001 
 
 
Pakistan 
1999–2001 
  
Up 
 
 
Sierra Leone 
1997–2003 
 
Turkey 
1981–1986 
 Table 1 summarizes the four possible combinations of shifts in 
the level of human rights protection and change in leadership.  
Given the strength of the theory and the empirics behind the 
notion that leadership change should correspond to higher levels 
of protection,59 the majority of the cases should follow the patterns 
of Pakistan and Sierra Leone.  These are our typical cases.60  In the 
next two sections we take a closer look at the Turkish and Fijian 
cases, in order to investigate circumstances that may account for 
the abnormal consequences of economic sanctions and leadership 
survival for rights protection.  This effort seeks to explore potential 
causal explanations that are thus far omitted in the literature.61 
 
59 See Marinov, supra note 2, at 565 (explaining that if sanctions are effective 
in destabilizing leaders, the leaders have an incentive to compromise and produce 
policy change); Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 453 (concluding that real 
improvements in human rights occur when a society becomes fully democratic). 
60 See GERRING, supra note 14, at 91 (explaining the use of typical cases in case 
study research). 
61 In a recent article Vreeland unfolds new conditions that influence the 
practice of torture and countries’ decisions to join the 1984 Convention Against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT):  
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4.1.  Turkey 
Economic sanctions were imposed on Turkey following the 
collapse of democracy in 1980.  It was the third time that the 
military assumed control of modern Turkey, arguably with the 
goal of restoring order and economic progress.62  Normalization 
towards democracy was criticized in all three instances, in 
particular with respect to the 1983 transition: 
One of the main arguments . . . is that all three transitions to 
democracy in Turkey (1950, 1961, and 1983) displayed the 
essential characteristics of the reform mode of transition—
in which the transition process was initiated and controlled 
by the authoritarian power holders—with important 
consequences for the ensuing democratic regimes. . . . I 
argue that the exclusionary or quasi-exclusionary nature of 
the constitution-making processes (the first excluded 
former Democrats, and the second excluded all political 
parties) adversely affected the stability of the ensuing 
democratic regimes, thus depriving the constitutions of 
popular legitimacy.63 
The 1983 democratization process represents a singular 
transition since the head of the state under the military dictatorship 
emerged as the newly elected president of the country, under a 
constitution that was conceived by the armed forces.  Because the 
constitution was subject to a national referendum, after 
 
Dictatorships that legally endorse more than one political point of view 
by legalizing political parties ironically practice higher levels of torture 
than closed dictatorships.  The argument follows [the] idea that violence 
is higher when power is divided. Dictatorships with political parties face 
pressure to adopt policies to co-opt support, including the adoption of 
international arrangements such as the CAT. 
Vreeland, supra note 8, at 93. 
62 See FEROZ AHMAD, THE MAKING OF MODERN TURKEY 181 (1993) (surveying 
the 1980 military takeover’s efforts to address “social divisions, the economic 
breakdown, and the anarchy and violence”); see generally ERGUN ÖZBUDUN, 
CONTEMPORARY TURKISH POLITICS: CHALLENGES TO DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION 
(2000) (providing a history of Turkish politics, including the occupation of 1980); 
A. Aydin Cecen et al., Economic Growth and Structural Change in Turkey 1960–88, 26 
INT’L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 37 (1994) (noting that “in the early 1980s Turkey 
ostensibly entered a new era of export-led economic growth”); Ben Lombardi, 
Turkey—The Return of the Reluctant Generals?, 112 POL. SCI. Q. 191 (1997). 
63 ÖZBUDUN, supra note 62, at 9. 
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deliberation of an elected constitutional assembly, the Turkish 
transition meets the test and is thereby classified as a 
democratization process by two widely adopted indices:  Polity, 
and the Alvarez, Cheibub, Limongi, and Przeworski (“ACLP”) 
database.64  Given our interest in the consequences of political 
survival for the protection of human rights, this Article takes issue 
with the circumstances of the Turkish transition.  The fact that the 
former dictator remained in power after 1983 signals cooptation of 
the political sphere and warrants further investigation.  Indeed, the 
transition did not bring a substantive change to political 
institutions in Turkey, despite the ascension of Prime Minister 
Turgut Ozal following general elections.65  If anything, it granted 
the former dictator, General Kenan Evren, a mantle of legitimacy.66  
It was clear that the military retained its tutelage over political 
matters.67  For these reasons, Turkey is analyzed here as a country 
that was the target of economic sanctions in 1981, following the 
collapse of democracy.  However, the 1983 democratization 
process in Turkey does not meet our threshold of leadership 
change.68  Turkey illustrates a case of economic sanctions that did 
not destabilize the regime to the point of political reengineering. 
Given the outcome of leadership survival in Turkey following 
the imposition of economic sanctions, an increase in human rights 
violations is expected.  In fact, based on research conducted by 
Nikolay Marinov, incumbents that are the target of economic 
sanctions are twenty-eight percent more likely to lose power the 
following year.69  When placed under that spotlight, authoritarian 
 
64 See Jaggers & Gurr, supra note 58 (providing an explanation of the Polity 
project and assessing its validity); Adam Przeworski et al., Political and Economic 
Data Codebook and Database, 1999, available at, http://www.ssc.upenn.edu 
/~cheibub/data/Default.htm. This dataset is associated with ADAM PRZEWORSKI 
ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND WELL-BEING IN 
THE WORLD, 1950-1990 (2000). 
65 See ÖZBUDUN, supra note 62 (noting that only a few political parties were 
allowed to compete in the general elections). 
66 Id. at 9 (explaining the consequences of the quasi-exclusionary nature of 
the constitution-making process). 
67 See Amnesty International, Turkey Briefing, I, AI Index EUR/44/65/88 
(Nov. 1988) (confirming that the 1982 Constitution “provided for increased 
powers for the President, while restricting fundamental rights, and increasing 
mechanisms of state control”). 
68 See AHMAD, supra note 62, at 186–188 (providing a detailed account of the 
undemocratic circumstances under which the constitutional referendum took 
place). 
69 Marinov, supra note 2, at 565. 
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leaders tend to resort to any and all means to tighten their grip on 
power, including repression.  In this context, economic sanctions 
may have the unintended consequence of worsening the human 
rights situation in the target country, because leaders prefer to curb 
domestic dissent by violent means.  In the case of Turkey, the 
preoccupation of the Head of State with the country’s image 
abroad was aggravated by credible threats of expulsion from the 
Council of Europe.  During a 1981 visit to Ankara, West Germany’s 
Foreign Minister communicated this threat to General Kenan 
Evren in unambiguous language.70 
Nevertheless, despite expectations that human rights 
protection would decrease in Turkey following the 1980 coup and 
the subsequent imposition of economic sanctions, several widely 
adopted measures of human rights protection contradict this 
prediction.  Figure 2 clearly shows these trends. 
FIGURE 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The graph is unequivocal with respect to the steep 
deterioration of human rights protection in 1980, the year of the 
coup.  But, subsequently, the scores reveal the improvement in 
 
70 AHMAD, supra note 62, at 185 (“He warned the generals that their 
repressive measures could lead to Turkey’s expulsion from the Council of Europe 
and to the suspension of economic aid so vital for recovery.”). 
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rights protection referenced above.  The line representing political 
rights is even more consistent in its slope, indicating that rights to 
physical integrity, the ones captured by the category “political 
rights,” enjoyed increased protection.71 
Even if improvements in the protection of civil liberties do not 
display as strong an increase, the trend is clearly upward.  
Moreover, higher levels of protection set in right after the collapse 
of democracy in 1981.  At that moment, the literature would have 
predicted increased levels of repression as the National Security 
Council and General Evren focused on power consolidation.  
However, during the first years of the dictatorship—still way 
ahead of the onset of the 1983 “democratization” process—the 
level of human rights protection increased.72  What explains the 
Turkish anomaly in light of the findings in the human rights 
literature?73  This Article argues that part of the explanation lies in 
the accomplishments of General Evren’s regime in the economic 
realm, as predicted by the human rights literature itself, but that 
other important factors are:  (1) the negotiated nature of the 
transition, and (2) the economic and political chaos that prevailed 
in Turkey before the coup.  The quantitative literature on human 
rights protection is silent about the latter two.  We proceed now to 
analyze these aspects of the Turkish case. 
The relationship between economic well-being and human 
rights protection is well established in the literature.74  Briefly 
stated, countries with better economic indicators tend to 
experience increased levels of protection.  This relationship is 
 
71 This finding is based on aggregate data collected by Freedom House.  It is 
corroborated in the Political Terror Scale and the CIRI database.  C.f. Amnesty 
International, supra note 67 (documenting very serious instances of torture, as well 
as deaths resulting from torture, during the years 1980-1988). 
72 The human rights literature that favors quantitative methods adopts the 
practice of lagging the observation of the dependent variable by 3 to 5 years.  
Control variables, such as growth, particularly take time to impact the level of 
human rights protection.  Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 444–45. 
73 See Davenport, supra note 3, at 540; Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, 
at 453 (explaining analysis of the data collected on the relationship between 
democratic processes and human rights violations). 
74 See BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6, at 102 (suggesting that the 
protection of human rights will “promote economic growth and greater national 
prosperity”); LANDMAN, supra note 18, at 108–11 (explaining that democracy and 
wealth are “significantly associated with lower levels of human rights 
violations”). 
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clearly mediated by the presence of democratic institutions.75  For 
the purposes of the case under analysis—Turkey between 1976 and 
1986—the economic indicators speak unambiguously of the terrible 
state of the economy during the years that preceded the coup, as 
well as of the sharp improvements that Evren’s rule brought about.  
The country’s GDP growth rate went from ten percent, in 1976, to 
negative two percent, in 1980.  After twelve months of 
authoritarian rule, the GDP growth rate was back at five percent a 
year.  For the next five years, the rate oscillated between four and 
seven percent. 
With respect to social unrest, the inability of political parties to 
form and sustain a viable government led to state paralysis and to 
mounting social protests.  The dire situation of human rights 
protection at that time was documented by Amnesty 
International’s report.76  Feroz Ahmad points out the frustration 
among the population during the years preceding the breakdown 
of democracy: 
The public, worn down by the breakdown of law and 
order, the galloping inflation and shortages of basic goods, 
the squabbles among the parties and the paralysed 
parliament, welcomed martial law and the promise of 
stability it offered.  Few bargained for the radical 
transformation the commanders had in mind or the 
ruthless manner in which they implemented their policies.77  
In the case of Turkey, we argue that the economic chaos that 
preceded the military coup paved the way for the generals.  
Without three-digit inflation and close to fifteen percent of the 
population unemployed,78 their level of support would have been 
much lower in 1980.  This is an important point, because the 
human rights literature pays little attention to the status quo ante 
when studying the impact of economic indicators on human rights 
protection. 
 
75 See LANDMAN, supra note 18, at 110 (showing a negative correlation 
between democratic government and human rights abuses). 
76 “In December 1978 martial law was imposed in 13 provinces in response to 
violent riots in the southeastern city of Kahramanmaras, during which over 100 
people were killed.  During the nine months after the Kahramanmaras riots the 
government extended martial law to cover 20 provinces.”  Amnesty International, 
supra note 67, at 1. 
77 AHMAD, supra note 62, at 182. 
78 Cecen et al., supra note 62, at 44. 
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Another aspect of the Turkish democratization process worth 
emphasizing is the negotiated nature of the transition.  Similar to 
what happened in Brazil in 1985, and in Chile after Augusto 
Pinochet, the military chose the terms of the transition and played 
a heavy hand in designing the democratic institutions that would 
emerge.  We argue that negotiated transitions entail a less 
repressive shift in power.  In fact, because the military had close 
oversight of the process, other groups within society moderated 
their demands for fear that the military would renege on its 
decision to democratize.  It follows that the transition became less 
contentious, and therefore less violent.79  The absence of repression 
in this case had nothing to do with a “benevolent dictator,” but 
rather resulted from an attitude of hesitation amongst the 
population. 
We argue that the combination of all three factors accounts for 
the improved level of human rights protection in Turkey, and the 
timing in which it occurred, following the onset of military rule in 
1980.80  A closer look at Turkey during the ten-year period 
surrounding the imposition of economic sanctions does not 
disprove the notion that leadership survival is often associated 
with more human rights violations.  Nevertheless, the Turkish case 
sheds light on two factors that the literature should pay attention 
to, namely the priors to the economic performance of the 
dictatorship and the nature of the transition to democracy. 
The role that economic sanctions played is at best unclear.  We 
do not have strong evidence linking the feeble and controversial 
efforts towards democracy to economic pressure visited by the 
sanctions.  If anything, more credible pressure seems to have come 
from Germany’s threat to expel Turkey from the Council of 
 
79 Kathryn Sikkink argues that U.S. foreign policy played an important role in 
the level of repression in Latin America, suggesting that foreign policy 
characteristics may be a factor in these transitions to democracy.  KATHRYN 
SIKKINK, MIXED SIGNALS: U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY AND LATIN AMERICA 104 
(2004). 
80 Vreeland’s argument, that closed dictatorships signal their willingness to 
repress so effectively that they actually need to engage in less repression, may 
apply here.  Vreeland, supra note 8, at 69.  There is some evidence that the number 
of political killings in Turkey lessened right after the military coup, while other 
human rights violations increased.  See Amnesty International, supra note 67, at 5 
(providing several descriptive examples of human rights oppressions following 
the 1980 coup by the military regime in Turkey). 
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Europe.81  To reinforce the limited role of economic sanctions in the 
Turkish case, Hufbauer et al. classify the cost of sanctions to the 
target—both the cost as a percent of GNP and the cost per capita—
as negligible.82 
4.2.  Fiji 
The Fijian case constitutes another interesting puzzle where  a 
leadership change took place, but the protection of human rights 
continued to decline.  The benchmark year for the Fijian case is 
1987, when Brigadier General Sitiveni Rabuka led military coups in 
May and October, arguably to protect indigenous Fijian interests 
over those of Fijians of Indian descent (“Indo-Fijians”), who by 
then comprised a slight majority of the population.  In December of 
1987, General Rabuka turned power over to Ratu Sir Penaia 
Ganilau, who was Governor-General before the military coup.  
General Rubuka went on to proclaim Ganilau the first President of 
the Republic of Fiji.  Subsequently, an interim civilian government 
was appointed.83  This change came after months of struggle 
between the two men over who would actually hold executive 
authority and over how the island should be governed.84  For our 
purposes, it is sufficient to establish that power changed hands at 
least once, from Rabuka to Ganilau, following the imposition of 
economic sanctions. 
Sanctions were imposed by India immediately following the 
May 1987 coup, because the coup led to the removal from power of 
a legitimately elected coalition government that, although headed 
by a Fijian, consisted mainly of Indo-Fijians.85  Australia and New 
Zealand, Fiji’s powerful neighbors and trading partners, also 
 
81 See generally AHMAD, supra note 62, at 193 (describing modern Turkey’s 
evolution, including military intervention and political and economic 
restructuring). 
82 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 119. 
83 James Shrimpton, Familiar Faces Lead Fiji as Civilians Take Over, THE 
ADVERTISER, Dec. 7, 1987 (describing Fiji’s return to civilian rule, and the parties 
involved). 
84 Roger Barltrop, Obituary: Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, THE INDEP., Jan. 3, 1994, at 
21 (listing some of Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau’s life events in an obituary). 
85 See Ralph Premdas, General Rabuka and the Fiji Elections of 1992, 33 ASIAN 
SURV. 997, 998 (1993) (“But in 1987 the governing party lost to a coalition 
government led by a Fijian but mainly backed by Indians.”).  See Andrew 
McEwen, The Crisis in Fiji: Britain Resists Gandhi Pressure for Sanctions, THE TIMES, 
May 25, 1987, at 9 (describing India’s attempt to convince Britain to join in 
economic sanctions against Fiji until they restored the elected government). 
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joined in the trade ban and escalated their measures following the 
second coup in October, especially in response to violations of 
labor rights.86  All three countries lobbied for others to join the 
sanctions effort, particularly Britain with its colonial ties to Fiji.87  
While the rest of the world strongly condemned the military coup 
in Fiji, no other country joined the sanctions bandwagon.   
Fiji became an independent state within the British 
Commonwealth in 1970 and until 1987 served as a “model 
multiethnic postcolonial democracy.”88  Its transformation to a 
multiethnic state began during the colonial period in 1879, when 
the British brought South Asians to work the sugar fields.89  
Political differentiation between the two groups traces back to 
colonial times, when the British granted indigenous Fijians 
perpetual rights to tribal lands.  This advantage was 
institutionalized by the 1970 Constitution that also guaranteed 
ethnic Fijians a majority of seats in an open electoral parliamentary 
system.90  Under the convoluted and racially based electoral 
system set out in this constitution, Fiji successfully held five 
elections that by all accounts were generally free and fair.  
However, the victorious party in every one of these elections was 
the Melanesian-dominated Alliance Party; and, the only Prime 
Minister elected was Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara. 
After seventeen years of comfortably holding onto power, and 
amid allegations of corruption and mismanagement, the Alliance 
Party narrowly lost out to a multiracial Labor-Federation 
coalition.91  Throughout the campaign, the Alliance Party exploited 
 
86 Matthew Moore, ACTU Puts Ban on Maritime Trading; Rabuka’s Second Coup, 
SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sept. 29, 1987, at 12; see Stephen Taylor, Tensions Raise 
Fears of Fiji Violence: Rebel Regime in Suva Faces Pressure from Pacific Neighbours, THE 
TIMES, Sept. 26, 1987 (“The strongest condemnations came from Australia and 
New Zealand, who will now consider methods, including economic sanctions, of 
bringing the military regime swiftly to its knees.”). 
87 McEwen, supra note 85. 
88 Andrew Scobell, Politics, Professionalism, and Peacekeeping: An Analysis of the 
1987 Military Coup in Fiji, 26 COMP. POL. 187, 187 (1994). 
89 Id. at 187–88. 
90 Id. at 189.  See also MONTY G. MARSHALL & KEITH JAGGERS, CTR. FOR SYSTEMIC 
PEACE, POLITY IV COUNTRY REPORT 2006: FIJI 2 (2006), http://www.systemicpeace 
.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2009) (“Fijian politics has been characterized by a strong 
indigenization movement since its adoption of an open electoral parliamentary 
system upon independence in 1970.”). 
91 See Scobell, supra note 88, at 191 (“The election of April 5-11, 1987, brought 
a slim victory for the Coalition: it won twenty-eight seats to the Alliance’s twenty-
four.”). 
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fears of Communism and painted the challengers as radical 
leftists.92  In the aftermath of this campaign, the newly elected 
Prime Minister Dr. Timoci Bavadra unfolded his plan to drastically 
reduce the military—later labeled one of his most threatening 
proposals and probably the most influential in his overthrow.93 
The Royal Fijian Military Forces (“RFMF”) had gained great 
respect within the country and grew exponentially after it began 
participating in peacekeeping missions abroad in 1978.94  As the 
RFMF rose in prominence so did coup leader Rabuka, causing 
some authors (such as Scobell) to find that attributing the coup 
solely to ethnic hostility is simplistic and that Rabuka was mainly 
interested in safeguarding his personal interests.95  Regardless of 
Rabuka’s personal motivations, he succeeded in exacerbating the 
atmosphere of ethnic tension with proclamations such as “Fiji for 
Fijians!”96  He also implemented a propaganda campaign aimed at 
exploiting religious differences between indigenous Christians and 
Indo-Fijian Hindus.97  This political environment persisted under 
Ganilau’s civilian government, leading to a mass exodus of Indo-
Fijians and to Fiji’s expulsion from the Commonwealth of Nations, 
an international boycott, and foreign censure.98 
It is against this background that we observe the level of 
human rights protection in Fiji for the years 1972–2007.  Figure 3 
displays Freedom House scores for political rights and civil 
liberties in Fiji.  The steep worsening of rights protection, 
represented by higher scores in the graph, is clearly noticeable in 
1987 following the political turmoil.  Political rights scores are 
visibly worse, especially when compared to pre-coup levels. 
 
 
 
 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 191, 195 (“[T]he critical factor [in the 1987 coup] was the RFMF’s 
perception of the new Coalition government as procommunist and antimilitary.”). 
94 Id. at 190. 
95 See, e.g., id. at 192 (arguing that ethnic tensions did not “precipitate” the 
coup). 
96 Premdas, supra note 85, at 997. 
97 See STEPHANIE LAWSON, TRADITION VERSUS DEMOCRACY IN THE SOUTH 
PACIFIC: FIJI, TONGA AND WESTERN SAMOA 64 (1996) (“Indeed, Rabuka’s own 
propaganda campaign can only be interpreted as a manipulation to maximum 
advantage of the plural society syndrome.”). 
98 Premdas, supra note 85, at 997. 
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FIGURE 3. 
 
As we can see, for both political rights and civil liberties 
protection, the worst year was 1987.  Following the second coup in 
October, Rabuka suspended civil rights by decree, “assuming 
powers of detention without trial, [suspending] [a]ll political and 
trade union activity . . . and [providing] the army-backed 
government [with] . . . the right to restrict the movement of people, 
including departures from the country.”99 
The extent to which this decline in the level of human rights 
protection is attributable to economic sanctions is the question to 
which we now turn.  After 1987, an interim civilian government 
was put in place, and although the situation improved slightly, 
repression continued and ensured Rabuka’s goals.  This interim 
government was responsible for drafting the new constitution, 
which—although reviewed by several bodies—was put into effect 
 
99 Around the World: Fiji Coup Leader Limits Civil Rights with Decree, THE GLOBE 
AND MAIL, Oct. 26, 1987. 
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“without first being released for public scrutiny.”100  The result was 
a document that was “ethnically inegalitarian [sic] . . . [and] 
assigned electoral preeminence to the minority Fijians over the 
combined majority of Indians, Europeans, Chinese, Mixed Races, 
and Other Pacific Islanders.”101  In addition to the advantage 
granted to indigenous Fijians, ethnic groups were clearly 
delineated and electoral participation could only take place within 
these confines.102  The constitution also reflected other disparities 
of Fijian society.  Provincial divisions were skewed so that less 
dense constituencies received more seats than more populated 
urban areas, with the goal of minimizing the influence of areas that 
had helped the Labor Federation Party win in 1987, and to 
consolidate power with the traditionally important tribal chiefs 
based in the east.103  One author sums up:  “Although the 
constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji sets up a 
form of elective parliamentary rule, even the most generous of 
interpretations cannot disguise the non-democratic nature of its 
political institutions.”104  
The contentious nature of the democratization process in Fiji 
lies at the root of their dismal situation with respect to human 
rights after 1987.  This argument finds support in human rights 
literature, especially the work of Davenport, who assesses the 
consequences of democratization on protection of human rights 
under two headings:  political restrictions and killings.  Davenport 
writes: 
[Observers] would expect democratization to decrease 
restriction as well as killing for this form of regime change 
represents an increased respect for human life and political 
freedom.  It may be the case, however, that the various 
commitments made and mechanisms developed during the 
process of regime change are partial or unstable in nature, 
 
100 LAWSON, supra note 97, at 64–65. 
101 Premdas, supra note 85, at 997. 
102 See id. at 999 (outlining the features of the 1990 constitution and its 
radically different electoral system). 
103 See Premdas, supra note 85, at 999-1000 (highlighting the historical 
developments that created this eastern-western political rift). 
104 LAWSON, supra note 97, at 75. 
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whereby democratic change would decrease killing, but 
would have no impact on the use of political restrictions.105 
To corroborate Davenport’s predictions that states undergoing 
democratization may experience an increase in levels of repression 
and fewer killings,106 we review CIRI’s data on Fiji, finding that 
extrajudicial killings worsened in the actual year of the coup but 
then returned to pre-coup levels, whereas political imprisonment 
and torture increased from the year of the coup until the 
implementation of the new constitution.107  Clearly, the Fijian case 
confirms what Davenport labels as “the tanning effect,” which is a 
reduction in instances of killings.  We find that the human rights 
violations captured by some of the aggregate measures of rights 
protection, such as Freedom House scores displayed in Figure 1,108 
correspond to instances of political restrictions and can be 
explained by the democratization argument. 
So far, no evidence that economic sanctions are to blame for the 
abysmal situation of human rights in Fiji following the 1987 
military coup has been found.109  We support Hufbauer et al. in 
their assertion that economic sanctions had “little or no 
contribution” to the political outcome.110  To the extent that 
sanctions played any role at all, they pushed the democratization 
agenda, which took several more years to accomplish.  During this 
timeframe, leadership change in Fiji should have mitigated the 
 
105 Davenport, supra note 3, at 545. 
106 Id. at 540 (predicting that state movement “toward democracy [that] 
confront[s] diverse forms of conflict proves to be hazardous for citizen’s rights”). 
107 Cingranelli & Richards, supra note 52. 
108 FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 35 (showing that the level of human rights 
protections precipitously drop between 1985 and 1990). 
109 The massive emigration of Indo-Fijians following the coup suggests that 
they, as a group, faced particularly harsh limitations on their rights.  According to 
research by the Asia Pacific Migration Research Network, Indo-Fijians comprised 
91% of emigrants between 1987-1995 due to “political uncertainty, lack of security 
for land, and the current overall discriminatory treatment.”  The decision of many 
to flee was probably influenced by a few well-publicized incidents like the arrest 
of sociologist and Labour stalwart Dr. Naidu who was imprisoned, blindfolded, 
gagged and beaten up under the ambiguously worded anti-sedition law.  Indo-
Fijians began to leave the country in droves, with approximately 40,000, of the 
80,000 that came in between 1973-1994, leaving after the coups.  For quotes and 
data, see Asia Pacific Migration Research Network, Issues Paper from Fiji: Migration 
Issues in the Pacific, http://www.unesco.org/most/apmrnwp6.htm (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2009). 
110 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 80 (labeling the policy result of sanctions 
imposed on Fiji as having “little or no contribution”). 
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unintended adverse consequences of the democratization 
process—and perhaps it did, but with respect to killings only.  
Levels of repression remained high almost until 2000, when they 
finally declined to the pre-coup threshold.111 
The Fijian case study reinforces the need to analyze human 
rights data at the disaggregated level, given that consequences 
associated with leadership change may vary with respect to what 
Davenport has labeled the “taming” versus the “pacifying” 
effects.112  This case also speaks to the need for further research on 
democratization processes, especially those where leadership 
change takes place, precisely because of expectations grounded in 
the literature—namely that transitions will occur without major 
setbacks for human rights protection. 
5.  FURTHER RESEARCH 
Given the pioneer nature of this investigation and the inherent 
limitations of its research design, several intervening factors were 
overlooked.  The inductive approach to typical and deviant cases113 
limited the analysis to independent variables that had meaning in 
these cases, thus neglecting trends in the literature that might as 
well carry explanatory power in a large quantitative study.  Next, 
two frameworks that warrant close scrutiny in future research are 
emphasized. 
Writing about the making, breaking, and reforming of 
international legal norms, Goldsmith and Posner propose that 
compliance with human rights is motivated by symmetric and 
asymmetric cooperation.114  In their view, state respect for human 
rights follows a logic of self-interested behavior, as opposed to the 
 
111 See FREEDOM HOUSE, supra note 35, Fig.1. 
112 Davenport, supra note 3, at 545.  According to Davenport, “taming” occurs 
in democratizing States when “the various commitments made and mechanisms 
developed during the process of regime change are partial or unstable in nature, 
whereby democratic change would decrease killing, but would have no impact on 
the use of political restrictions.”  “Pacifying” occurs in States that have completed 
democratizaion to the point that “the uncertainty and anxiety experienced in 
transitional societies is gone.” 
113 See GERRING, supra note 14. 
114 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
113 (2005) (proposing that human rights cooperation becomes possible once we 
acknowledge the possibility that some states care about human rights abuses 
committed in other states). 
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normative weight of an international legal system.115  They proceed 
by explaining how nationals in one state are often concerned with 
the well-being of co-nationals, co-religionists, or co-ethnics who 
form a minority in another state.116  According to Goldsmith and 
Posner, this symmetric logic explains respect for human rights 
amongst states.  There is also room for asymmetric cooperation, 
which plays an important role in democratic regimes.117  In the 
latter, voters who lack any ethnic or religious ties to the victims of 
human rights violations in another state demand that their own 
government take measures to raise the level of rights protection in 
that state.  Economic sanctions are only one of such measures.118  
Based on the framework proposed by Goldsmith and Posner, it 
appears that religious, ethnic, or other socio-cultural ties between 
the country that imposes economic sanctions and the target 
country may play a role in the impact those sanctions have on 
human rights protection in the target country.  This impact is 
mediated by pressures on leadership survival, as discussed earlier.  
Thus, following the logic of symmetric cooperation,119 it seems 
reasonable to expect any adverse impacts of economic sanctions on 
human rights to be milder in countries that have religious, ethnic, 
or other socio-cultural ties with the nation imposing sanctions.  
Conversely, in the absence of these linkages, sanctions episodes 
that fit the pattern of “leadership survival” cases are likely to be 
associated with the worst level of rights protection.120 
The work of Andrew Moravcsik provides a second framework 
for analysis.121  Moravcsik analyzed states’ preferences with respect 
to a strong regional human rights regime in Europe in the 
aftermath of World War II.  Surprisingly, he found that newly 
established democracies displayed greater support for such a 
 
115 Id. at 111 (explaining that the “relative absence of genocide and crimes 
against humanity, reflects a conscience of interest”). 
116 Id. at 113. 
117 Id. at 114 (describing how Great Britain’s asymmetric cooperation served 
to curtail  the slave trade worldwide). 
118 Id. at 116 (describing how U.S. “financial might” enabled the prosecution 
of certain Yugoslavian war criminals). 
119 Id. at 113. 
120 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
121 Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 622 (Beth A. Simmons & Richard H. Steinberg eds., 2006). 
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human rights regime122 compared to older democracies.123  The 
explanation, according to Moravcsik, lies in newly-established 
democracies’ desire to lock in the gains from the democratization 
process.  By delegating to a powerful judicial body—in this case, 
the European Court of Human Rights—new democracies and their 
leaders insulate themselves from authoritarian forces.124 
A similar dichotomy appears to apply to countries that are 
targeted by economic sanctions.  Sanctions are typically more 
effective against democracies.125  But could sanctions be even more 
effective when they target newly-established democracies?  If so, 
are there consequences for human rights protection in these 
countries, given the pressures that are inherent to the 
democratization process itself?126  Subsequent research should 
exhaust these intervening variables, especially if a large-N 
quantitative study is pursued. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This project’s initial goal was to investigate the impact that 
economic sanctions have on human rights protection through the 
operation of shifts in the target country’s political leadership.  
Building on three different strands of literature, the Authors 
reached the following conclusions:  economic sanctions tend to be 
less effective against dictatorships127 because threatened dictators 
 
122 Id. at 638 (observing that the willingness of a state to recognize 
compulsory jurisdiction of and allow individual petitions to international courts 
are good measures of the state’s willingness to accept human rights obligations 
generally). 
123 Id. at 638–39 (discussing similarities between established and transitional 
democracies in their hesitancy to accept regional human rights obligations). 
124 Id. at 642 (noting that combating domestic threats to democracy was “the 
most consistent public justification” for membership in the European Court of 
Human Rights). 
125 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 166–68 (presenting data suggesting that 
democracies are more willing to accommodate the “sender’s” demands than 
autocratic regimes). 
126 See, e.g., Davenport, supra note 3, at 540 (noting that states experience 
“various combinations of restrictions and killing” as they progress toward 
democratization).  See also Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 453 
(discussing relationships between development of democratic institutions and 
human rights protection). 
127 HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 1, at 166 (noting that evidence suggests 
autocratic regimes are less susceptible to economic sanctions than democratic 
governments). 
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often engage in more repression,128 and because economic 
sanctions destabilize dictators at higher rates.129  Thus, economic 
sanctions have an adverse impact on rights protection in autocratic 
societies. 
A cursory look at a select group of economic sanctions episodes 
led to classification of the cases according to two main variables:   
leadership survival and shifts in human rights protection.  Cases 
that contradicted the literature’s standard explanations included 
Turkey in 1980 and Fiji in 1987.  In Turkey, rights protection 
improved, despite the fact that the dictator remained in control; 
while in Fiji, rights protection worsened following leadership 
change.  This puzzle deserved further investigation. 
The Authors proceeded to study the political history of Turkey 
around the time of the 1980 military coup.  This investigation was 
guided by several findings in the human rights literature that had 
relevant implications, particularly regarding the relationship 
between human rights and economic growth, population growth, 
political parties, international conflict, and civil war.130  The 
Authors conclude that economic growth holds a powerful 
explanation for the improvement in rights protection following the 
collapse of democracy in Turkey.  Also, it seems that pre-coup 
political chaos heightened the impact of good growth in the 
aftermath of the transition.  Finally, the negotiated nature of the 
Turkish transition resulted in fewer instances of violent repression. 
The Authors took a similar approach with Fiji.  Here, political 
historians emphasized ethnic tensions, the nature of the military, 
 
128 See Bueno de Mesquita et al., supra note 3, at 451 (noting that human rights 
violations increase in states that have attained “intermediate” levels of 
democracy). 
129 But see Marinov, supra note 2, at 573 (observing that democratic regimes 
suffer “much more government instability” under the pressure of sanctions). 
130 See SIMMONS, supra note 5.  See also BUENO DE MESQUITA ET AL., supra note 6 
(applying theory examining political expediency and consequences of various 
domestic and foreign policy alternatives).  Compare Vreeland, supra note 8 at 69 
(noting that multi-party dictatorships tend to have higher levels of torture), and 
Hafner-Burton, supra note 4 (examining relationships between human rights and 
international trade agreements), and Richards et al., supra note 4 (discussing 
possible relationships between foreign investment and human rights protections), 
and Downs and Jones, supra note 7 (emphasizing the role of reputational concerns 
in regimes’ decisions to comply with international human rights obligations), with 
Abouharb & Cingranelli, supra note 4 (discussing the human rights implications of 
World Bank economic liberalization requirements and arguing that the World 
Bank SAAs warn government respect for human rights). 
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and civil-military relations as key explanations for the 1987 coup.131  
Though these ad-hoc arguments offered valuable insight, there was 
a deeper connection to the explanations offered in the human 
rights literature.  Among that literature, the work of Christian 
Davenport emerged as a key to the Fijian puzzle.132  It seems clear 
that the democratization process in Fiji was very contentious—
partly because of the factors identified by political historians.  It 
was indeed a case where increased levels of repression were 
accompanied by fewer killings, and thereby an instance where 
democratization realized its “taming” effect, falling short of full 
“pacification.”133 
When targeted by economic sanctions, will countries that 
experience leadership change be able to merely tame repression?  
Will countries with a strong economy be able to pacify dissent 
more effectively?  These questions have important policy 
implications, as we seek a better understanding of the foreign 
policy tools.  Human rights advocates will benefit from uncovering 
the unintended adverse consequences for human rights that follow 
from otherwise popular policies.  These are questions the Authors 
intend to explore in future research.  
 
 
131 See Scobell, supra note 88, at 192 (weighing the impact of ethnic tension 
and military-political issues on the May 1987 coup). 
132 See Davenport, supra note 3, at 544–45 (describing the “taming” effect that 
occurs in democratic transitions where killings decrease, but the government 
continues to impose repressive political restrictions). 
133 Id. 
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